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Tourism & animal suffering: Mapping the future

David A. Fennell [a,*], Bastian Thomsen [b]

[a] Department of Geography and Tourism Studies, Brock University, Canada
[b] Department of Human Dimensions of Natural Resources, Colorado State University, United States of America

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ABSTRACT

Research on animal ethics continues to escalate in tourism but does so in the absence of a comprehensive statement on animal suffering. This paper aims to rectify this deficiency through two broad aims. The first is to define suffering and related terms and provide a brief statement on the science of suffering; highlight issues related to the ethics of animal suffering; and provide a brief discussion on policy and suffering. The second aim is to develop a roadmap to eliminate animal suffering in tourism as a priority. The theoretical framework adopted in this paper rests within care ethics and empathy.

> "We decide what kind of world we want it to be. But we must keep in mind, that if we over-protect and fail to use animals, there will be problems…"
>
> [(Vantassel, 2010, p. 469)]

Introduction

While there continues to be a steady and sustained increase in research on animal ethics in tourism (Winter, 2020), a comprehensive statement on animal suffering is absent from the literature. Studies that do discuss animal suffering often do so from a utilitarian perspective, especially in wildlife tourism. Examples include balancing costs and benefits between local community development and whale shark suffering (Dobson, 2006); suffering and equal consideration of interests from the perspective of preference utilitarianism (Fennell, 2012b); and the balance between conservation outputs with the suffering that comes with poor welfare standards in wildlife tourism attractions (Moorhouse, D'Cruze, & Macdonald, 2017). Bertella (2019) discusses suffering through the lens of ecofeminism and more specifically entangled empathy in reconfiguring sustainable wildlife tourism.

Animal suffering has also been discussed in defining the theoretical landscape of animal welfare (Fennell, 2013) and animal rights (Fennell, 2012a), within a proposed 11th Article for the UN's Global Code of Ethics for Tourism (Fennell, 2014), and on halal food tourism (Henderson, 2016). "'Suffering' is not an elusive, non-scientific term but can be seen as an important part of

* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: dfennell@brocku.ca, (D.A. Fennell), bastian.thomsen@anthro.ox.ac.uk. (B. Thomsen).

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biology and used in both the definition and practical assessment of animal welfare" (Dawkins, 2008, p. 943). Broom (1991) declares that

> The term "welfare" refers to the state of an individual in relation to its environment, and this can be measured. Both failure to cope with the environment and difficulty in coping are indicators of poor welfare. Suffering and poor welfare often occur together, but welfare can be poor without suffering and welfare should not be defined solely in terms of subjective experiences (p. 4167).

As such, suffering is not synonymous with, but rather a component of welfare. The connection between both concepts is reinforced in farm animal welfare legislation in European countries where a clear distinction between "necessary" and "unnecessary" suffering is problematic in upholding welfare standards (Lundmark, Berg, & Röcklinsberg, 2013). The predominance of suffering in farming as an indicator of welfare suggests a focus on suffering is needed to better understand the dimensions of animal welfare in tourism studies and practices.

Research on animals and tourism has correspondingly explored links to government and industry. Sheppard and Fennell's (2019) analysis of progress in tourism's public policy domain regarding nonhuman animals (123 global policies) found that policies are decidedly anthropocentric enhancing human welfare over the welfare and rights of animals. Font, Bonilla-Priego, and Kantenbacher (2019)) found that travel trade associations generally ignore animal welfare responsibility. Only six of 62 associations mentioned animal welfare on their websites, and Font et al. (2019) do not mention animal suffering at all in their study.

A recent edition to the tourism and animal ethics debate includes Rickly and Kline's (2021) book on animals at work in the service of the tourism industry. Several chapters touch on suffering but only in a tangential manner. Examples include Quintero Venegas and López López (2021) on zonkeys; Daspher (2021) on animals in the workplace; Tully and Carr's (2021) investigation of farm attraction websites in New Zealand; and Vasilopoulou's (2021) case study on the donkeys of Santorini. Scholars make mention of the suffering of different species of animals used as food in Kline's (2018) book on animals, food and tourism (Kline, 2018). Similarly, one of the most detailed thematic and chronological summaries of animal ethics and tourism scholarship to date by Winter (2020) shows sporadic reference to suffering. Winter summarised over 70 contributors and their work to animal ethics in tourism, with suffering not obvious as a main theme.

A tourism paper that analyses animal suffering in greater detail is work by Fennell (2021), who employed Dolgert's (2012) work on invengeance and *pathei mathos* (explained in detail below). Fennell reasoned that tourism's sacrificial economy includes many animal uses that have enduring costs (sustained suffering) and ultimate costs (death) in the name of profit and pleasure. "Cost" refers to the reduced fitness or welfare of animals from uses that cause pain and suffering (Hamilton, 1964). Fennell (2021) argued that suffering must be given higher priority in the literature in an effort to create more responsible *touranimalscapes*, defined as "evolving patterns of animal concern and use (including refusal of use), on the part of individuals, cultures, regions, and organisations connected with the tourism industry" (p. 259).

However, as animal-based research advances, including topics of ethics, rights, and welfare, continues to escalate in tourism (see Carr & Broom, 2018; Fennell, 2012a, 2012b; Rickly & Kline, 2021; Thomsen et al., 2021; Thomsen et al., 2021; Winter, 2020), it does so in the absence of a comprehensive position on suffering. As such, this paper has two broad. The first is to define suffering and related terms as well as provide a brief statement on the science of suffering; highlight issues related to the ethics of animal suffering; and provide a brief discussion on policy and suffering. While tourism's focus on animal welfare is broad (see Fennell, 2014; Thomsen, Gosler, et al., 2021; Winter, 2020), it remains ineffective in addressing and eliminating suffering for its macro-level application in theory and practice. The second aim is to provide a roadmap, following Lilley, Hawkins, and Jennings (2014) work on animal research and testing, to help guide the processes required to eliminate all animal suffering in tourism. Modelling suffering, therefore, will aid in understanding both the nature and degree of animal suffering in tourism.

For example, suffering in tourism is widespread across species, episodes, and cultures, and can range from captive Orca whales at SeaWorld, to the humiliation, drugging, pain, and sexual assault of a tiger at Tiger Kingdom in Mae Rim, Thailand, where a tourist squeezed the sedated animal's testicles while taking a selfie (Butler, 2020). This paper considers the suffering of all individuals from all species across the core types of animal use in tourism: animals as captives, forced into competition, pests and vectors, sport and subsistence, wildlife viewing, and animals used for work and companionship (Fennell, 2012a, 2012b). The theoretical framework adopted in this model rests primarily within the care ethics and empathy domain.

Historical background of animal suffering

Concern over the suffering of animals has a long history (Preece, 2007). Jeremy Bentham's (1780/1982) famous set of questions on the topic, i.e., "The question is not, Can they reason?, nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?" articulated a new frontier of concern based not on animal language or rationality, but rather animal consciousness. Such a stance worked in direct opposition to the prevailing Cartesian manner of viewing animals as machines without souls (without consciousness) regulated not by their own volition, but rather external, mechanistic forces.

The contemporary animal ethics movement also has its roots in suffering. Ruth Harrison (1964) in her book on animal suffering in agriculture entitled *Animal Machines*, Brigid Brophy's in her article to *The Sunday Times* in 1965 (Brophy, 1965), and Richard Ryder through his articles to *The Daily Telegraph* in 1969 (Wikipedia, 2020), all expressed concern

over animal suffering from human exploitation. Ryder coined the term "speciesism" to express the suffering that animals endure at our hand, by writing: "Quite apart from the right to live, one clear moral criterion is suffering, the suffering of imprisonment, fear and boredom as well as physical pain" (Ryder, 1970, see, also, Regan, 1980). More formally, speciesism is "a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the interests of members of one's species and against those of members of other species" (Singer, 2009, p. 6).

Animal ethics research has advanced because of the optics around the number and manner in which animals are used in industries such as animal experimentation and farming. Browning (2020) observes that 150 billion land animals and fish are raised in factory farms per year, mostly in poor conditions. Draught animals (cattle, buffaloes, horses, mules, camels, llamas, yaks, donkeys, elephants, and dogs) can endure unimaginable suffering, and after short, harsh lives are brutally slaughtered using crude methods (Ramaswamy, 1998). The response to these issues has been the development of a vast body of knowledge that spans the social sciences, humanities, and natural sciences—from neuroscience to ethics—on animal suffering, welfare, pain, stress, deprivation, and empathy.

Concern for animals has also advanced because of a broad shift in values regarding the welfare of animals that is based on three main drivers. These include (1) a higher frequency of pet-keeping, which has heightened sensitivities to animals in the eyes of adults and children; (2) ethology, based on how print media, television and movies have emphasised the emotional richness and complexity of animals; and (3) changing values and priorities as a result of the many ecological crises the planet is now facing (Benton & Redfearn, 1996).

It has been only recently that these sorts of questions and issues have been the topic of interest in tourism studies (Fennell, 2000), even though millions of animals are used for tourism purposes (Moorhouse et al., 2017). Recognizing this anthropocentric conundrum requires a new dialogue on how we can "equitably speak for nonhumans and foreground their agency, welfare, rights, and interests" (Thomsen, 2021, p.2) in first recognizing that animal suffering is abhorrent and immoral if anything is to change (Thomsen, 2021; Thomsen, Gosler, et al., 2021).

Terminology and the science of suffering

To appreciate the complexity of animal suffering in tourism, a working knowledge of suffering and suffering-related terms is necessary (see Table 1 for an extended list of terms). While space prevents a more detailed discussion of these terms, main concepts such as animal subjectivity, suffering, deprivation, welfare, pain, stress, and empathy are included alongside a brief discussion on the science and measurement of these terms. Important in this discussion is recognition that the *science* of suffering, i.e., reductionism and empiricism, differs considerably from the *moral* perspective (Fraser, 1999). This latter theme is discussed in the following section.

Wemelsfelder (1993) defines animal subjectivity as, "the capacity to interact with the environment in that this capacity endows behaviour with an active, future-focused nature which cannot be explained in mechanistic terms" (p. 71). Such a definition highlights the problems that science has in measuring what it is like to be another animal. Nagel (1974) writes that the subjective character of experience is widespread in many different animals although it is difficult to imagine, and that, "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to *be* that organism—something it is like *for* the organism" (p. 436). In trying to imagine what it is like to be a bat (Nagel's focus), we are constrained by the resources of our own minds. Our experiences would be nothing like the experiences of a bat, and perhaps never will, because "it is beyond our ability to conceive" (p. 439).

Suffering is "an unpleasant state of mind that disrupts the quality of life. It is the mental state associated with unpleasant experiences such as pain, malaise, distress, injury and emotional numbness (e.g., extreme boredom)" (Gregory, 2004, p. 1). As illustrated in Table 1, (Table 2 lists behaviours of suffering, and Table 3 environmental and situational variables, and deprivations, that lead to pain, stress and suffering), suffering encompasses the full spectrum of adverse effects that an animal can experience, from physical pain to stress and distress, anxiety, fear, and terror (Morton, Burghardt, & Smith, 1990). Suffering is difficult to pin down from scientific and conceptual standpoints, as Gregory observes, because it is not merely one condition and cannot be easily measured or assessed. However, Dawkins (2008) provides an animal ethology perspective to describe how suffering can be applied to animals in

> [a] behavioural way of recognizing suffering as states that people would work to get out of or avoid if they could also provides us with a way of recognizing animal suffering in an objective way…By defining suffering as emotional states characterised by being caused by negative reinforcers gives us an objective, measurable and behavioural way of understanding what matters to animals (Dawkins, 2008, p. 938–939).

Tables 1-3 are based on terminology used in the animal welfare, ethology, and physiology domain (see Boissy, 1995; Broom, 1991, 2004; Dawkins, 1988, 2008; King, 1998; Mroczek, 1992). These many behaviours, variables and deprivations that lead to suffering provide a rich foundation for policymakers, practitioners and scholars to understand in efforts to strengthen welfare standards and practices in tourism.

Scholars note that because suffering has an evolutionary function to play in humans, other beings along the evolutionary pathway that demonstrate similar behaviours and histories also have similar subjective capabilities (Aaltola, 2012). Furthermore, suffering in animals results in the reduction or loss of the ability to pursue what Aitken (2008) describes as central life projects:

evolved survival skills in specific environments that have developed through evolutionary time in order for animals to live well. If central life projects are suppressed, and animals are removed from their ideal environments, such amounts to a loss of purpose in life and translates to "animal as 'hopeless', 'depressed', 'having given up', 'lost within itself, 'lacking interest in its surroundings', 'low in energy', 'displaying abnormal behaviour', and so on" (Aitken, 2008, p. 173).

Deprivation is a form of suffering because animals in captive environments are prevented from practising normal behaviour in fulfilling wants and needs, which leads to adverse effects to the point where animals experience "intense or prolonged unpleasant subjective feelings" (Dawkins, 1988, p. 211). Deprivation is not just the physical limitations that animals are placed under, such as poor food quality and quantity, but also the denial of normal behaviours that animals would typically practice in the wild (e.g., marking the limits of an animal's range, social relations, exploration, and contact comfort) (see the third column in Table 3).

Several methods have been developed to measure suffering. The animal experimentation industry in the European Union (EU Directive 2010/63/EU) is regulated on the basis of four categories: unclassified, substantial, moderate and mild, which represent different levels of invasiveness and pain. In the mild category, procedures and applications range from the taking of a single, small or infrequent sample - including blood and urine - to a minor change in the animal's diet. It may also involve a simple, minimally obtrusive surgical procedures (Murnaghan, 2018a). Severe suffering is defined as

> Procedures on animals as a result of which the animals are likely to experience severe pain, suffering or distress, or long-lasting moderate pain, suffering or distress as well as procedures, that are likely to cause severe impairment of the well-being or general condition of the animals… (European Union, 2010, p. L 276/76).

From such procedures animals will suffer from significant changes in their normal state of health and well-being, and experimental procedures will be justified only if there is a direct benefit to medicine and human health (Murnaghan, 2018b).

Scholars have also developed suffering calculators that measure anthropogenic impacts on animals used in agriculture. Tomasik's (2018) calculator is based on the average lifespan of an animal, production over its lifetime, a sentience multiplier based on the cognitive and emotional sophistication of an animal, suffering per day of the life of the animal, number of days of life equivalent to pain and death, and the equivalent days of suffering caused per kg demanded (see, also, Warren, 2018).

In recognition of the subjective nature of suffering, animal welfare scientists have also devised indirect measures to eliminate farm animals' suffering. Scientists "ask" animals to choose which circumstances or settings are best for them by providing a range of different preferences, and then measure the strength of these preferences by investigating what price animals are willing to pay for to secure a preferred choice (Duncan, 2005). Observation through appropriate inquiries and reasoned analysis (Gregory, 2004) is often essential in assessing suffering (Rollin, 2004).

Closely connected to suffering is the concept of welfare, defined as "the state of an individual in relation to its environment" (Broom, 1991, p. 4167). Although related, welfare and suffering are not synonymous because an animal's welfare can be poor without suffering, and further that welfare should not be defined exclusively as subjective experiences (Broom, 1991; Carr & Broom, 2018). For example, a wolf in captivity may be fed kibble with poor nutritional qualities and may not like the taste, but it is not suffering from starvation. Wolfensohn (2020) illustrates that there is significant variability in how to measure the welfare of animals used in various enterprises. Major categories of poor welfare include reduced life expectancy, impaired growth, impaired reproduction, body damage (wounds), disease, immunosuppression (reduced ability to fight diseases), adrenal activity and heart rate, behaviour anomalies (stereotypies), and animals that self-narcotize to cope with conditions (sensory deprivation) that prevent the development of normal behaviour (Broom, 1991).

The most popular measures of animal welfare include the Five Freedoms and Five Domains models. The former is a measure of freedom from hunger and thirst, discomfort, pain/injury/disease, fear and distress, and the freedom to express natural behaviours (e.g., exercise according to the needs of a species) (Bansiddhi, Brown, & Thitaram, 2020; Farm Animal Welfare Council, 2009;). The Five Domains model is more refined and includes physiological, behavioural and emotional measures based on (1) nutrition; (2) environment; (3) health; and (4) atypical or abnormal behaviours such as stereotypies and social isolation. A composite measure based on the preceding four factors provides an assessment of an animal's mental state, the fifth domain, in gauging an animal's overall welfare (Mellor, 2017).

Suffering is also closely related to pain (Dawkins, 2008; Gregory, 2004). Pain, however, does not always lead to suffering (Aitken, 2008). Rats will endure significant pain (cold temperatures) to access tasty food even though there is adequate food at room temperatures (Broom & Johnson, 1993). Defined, pain is:

> an aversive sensory and emotional experience representing an awareness by the animal of damage or threat to the integrity of its tissues; it changes the animal's physiology and behaviour to reduce or avoid damage, to reduce the likelihood of recurrence and to promote recovery (Molony & Kent, 1997, p. 266).

Pain is also discussed in the literature according to its severity and longevity. Acute pain "does not outlast the healing process and is accompanied by autonomic changes, and it responds to analgesic treatment" (Molony & Kent, 1997, p. 267); while chronic pain "persists beyond the expected healing time for an injury" (Molony & Kent, 1997, p. 267). There is also a strong connection between pain and cruelty, where someone who is cruel deliberately inflicts pain on an animal for purposes of enjoyment or amusement (King, 1998).

Sneddon, Elwood, Adamo, and Leach (2014) contend that there are two key criteria in evaluating pain in animals. The first is a response to noxious and potentially painful events that affect neurobiology, physiology and behaviour, and the second is a change in their motivational state after being exposed to pain. Using these two principal criteria, Sneddon et al. (2014) show that animals in many taxa, including mammals, birds, amphibians and reptiles, fish, and arthropods, do physically feel pain. These findings are corroborated by Ferdowsian and Merskin (2012), who conclude that there are anatomical (major organs and tissues like liver, heart, and muscles), physiological (cortisol and beta-endorphin levels) and behavioural (seeking social companionship) similarities that are identical to how animals and humans experience pain.

Stress and anxiety are also frequently investigated in the literature on suffering. Stress "is a physiological disturbance that is imposed by a stressor, such as a threatening or harmful situation" (Gregory, 2004, p. 12), while anxiety is generally acknowledged to be an emotional state "induced by the perception of any potential danger that threatens the well-being of the individual, and which are characterised as a feeling of insecurity" (Boissy, 1995, p.166). Short-term stress is routinely measured in animals through blood, saliva, faecal, or urinary cortisol levels in wild and domesticated animals (Terio, Marker, & Munson, 2004). Evidence of longer-term chronic stress is often measured through hair cortisol (Heimbürge, Kanitz, & Otten, 2019). The problem for animals kept in captive settings, and exposed to new and different stressors, is that they cannot avoid aversive stimuli by executing adaptive reactions that have been refined over evolutionary time (Panzera, 2013).

Finally, most scholarly work focuses on suffering, pain and stress in animals as negative aspects. Balcombe (2009) argues that positive aspects of sentience such as the seeking of rewards and pleasure through play and touch require a greater degree of investigation in order to amplify "the moral burden of depriving animals the opportunity to lead fulfilling, enjoyable lives" (p. 208). The fact that animals experience pleasure makes the case for their protection a moral concern, instead of merely managing pain and suffering which is an empirical one. To this end, empathy is essential to investigate as a response to the suffering of others. Animals show intra-species empathy (de Waal, 2004), inter-species empathy (Pérez-Manrique & Gomila, 2018), but considerably more research focuses on human empathy toward animals (Furnham, McManus, and Scott (2003)). Researchers have also mapped the brain's neural pathways and found overlapping regions of the brain that show similar empathic responses between humans and dogs (Franklin Jr. et al., 2013).

The ethics of suffering

This section touches on the moral questions that frame animal suffering. Examples include wild animal suffering and utilitarianism, sentience and ecosystem functioning. However, the section's primary focus is on the use of care and empathy as theoretical constructs to enrich animals' lives (Panzera, 2013), which will be used later as the main theoretical anchor point to scaffold a model to end animal suffering in tourism.

In efforts to broaden the landscape on concern for the suffering of animals, scholars have turned their attention to welfare biology, which involves measuring the net happiness of a sentient animal (positive affective feelings), versus unhappiness (negative affective feelings) (Ng, 1995). Billions of wild animals must endure significant degrees of suffering from predation, daily stress, starvation, and disease to the point where net suffering exceeds net happiness (Ng, 2016; see, also, Tomasik, 2015). Moen (2016) argues that we have a moral duty to assist animals that suffer in the wild on utilitarian grounds, i.e., the greatest good for the greatest number. Additionally, there is a belief that suffering and happiness are asymmetrical. Shriver (2014) contends that asymmetric utilitarianism is premised on the notion that "*no* amount of pleasure for one person, or indeed even many people, could even in principle justify causing intense suffering in another being (p. 159).

Theorists have also developed thought experiments around hypothetical animal welfare states for compassionate stewardship. We could ease elephant suffering, for example, by providing cradle-to-grave health care for entire populations through immunocontraception; neonatal care; injuries, disease prevention and treatment; elephant orthodontics; draught; elephant psychiatric care; and various other uncertainties (Pearce, 2015). Whether this would make wild populations of elephants less wild is rejected by asking if humans are any less human by receiving the same treatment.

Moral questions are also tied to personal indulgence as the worst type of animal use because the motivation to use has nothing to do with humans' physiological needs, such as killing for food or staying warm, but rather recreational pleasure. Balon (2000) uses this rationale in reference to fishing, where the capture and killing of fish for sustenance is far more ethically praiseworthy than catching a fish and releasing back into the wild even though this fishing ethic is viewed as more responsible than killing and eating fish. The suffering that fish must endure in satisfying tourists' recreational needs is a topic that demands further scrutiny in tourism studies.

Empathy and care

Scholars use empathy to provide an alternative perspective to traditional objectivist theories that have deeply penetrated popular culture's consciousness (Coplan & Goldie, 2011; Maibom, 2014; Wolch & Emel, 1995). From a theoretical standpoint, empathy has found a home in care ethics, which is characterised by the intermingling of self to others through attentiveness, trust, responding to others' interests and needs, sensitivity, and empathy (Held, 2004). In the realm of animal ethics, these characteristics are extended to nonhuman animals in the same way (Adams & Donovan, 2007), providing a new epistemological and ontological bridge between human and nonhuman animals.

In his comprehensive overview of the work of Edith Stein (1917), Svenaeus (2018) explains that Stein's theory of empathy is focussed on the "experience of another person's experience" (p.742), or a "way of feeling oneself into the experiences of the other

person…" (p. 742). From this perspective, empathy is re-inactive according to what it would feel like, or be, in the shoes of another (Svenaeus, 2018). It is the act of "striving to understand" which is the very essence of being moral creatures (Aaltola, 2012), which requires a pre-reflective experience of the other as a being, not unlike oneself (Thompson, 2001) as a reference point for intersubjectivity (Aaltola, 2013). When we recognise others' despair, we can begin the process of sympathising for them (Luke, 1996; Sontag, 2004).

Bridging from the more general literature on care and empathy, Gruen (2015) emphasises the need to move in the direction of entangled empathy to better connect with sentient animals' needs and interests. Entangled empathy focuses on animals that need our attention, articulates what our responsibilities ought to be, and necessitates the formation of close bonds with animals to build empathy for a species and other species in transformative and radical ways. Entangled empathy further demands that we gather information from animal experts such as ethnologists and animal welfare experts to profoundly understand these beings' life-worlds. One of the many important messages in Gruen's perspective is that, like ethics in general, we have to continually practise empathy in order to make it a central force in our lives.

What often prevents a stronger bond attachment with animals is two mistakes (Gruen, 2015). Epistemic empathetic mistakes, involve underestimating the nature of animals' mental capabilities. We do this consistently in our interactions with animals which perpetuates the Cartesian mindset discussed earlier. The second, ethical inaccuracies include "affected ignorance" (Moody-Adams, 1994) and "empathetic overload". Affected ignorance explains why people choose to avoid considering why some practices are moral or and others not. The animal trainer who turns a blind eye to the suffering of animals is a case in point. Empathetic overload includes cases where animal activists or animal care workers cannot disengage their empathetic response to the plight of animals. These people end up breaking down or experiencing compassion fatigue because they cannot cope well with the horror of animal suffering (Aaltola, 2014; see, also Bertella, 2013 on tourism, empathy, animals and the media).

The public, policy, and animal suffering

Concern for the suffering of animals by anthropogenic forces is not just a contemporary phenomenon. Dolgert (2012); see also Fennell, 2021) argues that there were two political themes in ancient Greece that created a sacrificial economy: invengeance, and the *pathei mathos*. The former involved the routine sacrifice of animals because animals had no chance to retaliate or seek vengeance. Sacrifice, therefore, took place in the absence of guilt. The second theme, *pathei mathos*, is characterised as learning through suffering in achieving political wisdom. Because animals are sentient, Greek citizens and their political institutions, drew knowledge from the spectacle of animal suffering to prevent civil conflict and unrest. Parallel to animals' civic function was a culture of muting and forgetting animal suffering, which opened the door to significant animal abuse.

By the end of the 19th century, there were over 170 English-speaking people of all walks of life—religious and secular—who believed that animals possessed souls, i.e., they were conscious (Preece, 2007). These beliefs became formalised through legislation. For example, the Irish enacted a law in 1635 prohibiting the use of a horse's tail for ploughing and the pulling of wool from a live sheep (Kalof, 2007). Martin's law of 1822 prevented the cruel treatment of most agricultural animals (Turner, 1980), and the British Cruelty to Animal Act of 1835 outlawed animal baiting, running and fighting practices. Support for change in European society mounted as middle-class reform sought to suppress lower-class violence of animals, fuelled by drunkenness and idleness (Kete, 2002).

In the present age, the sheer number of new bills in the US Congress on all matters of animal use and welfare is sufficient proof of the evolving importance of animal concern in society (Rollin, 2004). Such change is represented in the European Union's progressive animal welfare standards, which are advanced around pets, wildlife, laboratory and farm animals. Article 13 of Title II of the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 recognises the sentience of these animals:

> …since animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the EU countries relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage (European Commission, 2020).

However, what occurs in theory (policy) does not always translate into good practice. Morris and Beatson (2011) make this point clear in discussing dichotomous positions in animal welfare policy regulation in New Zealand. The political 'centre-right' is the animal welfare establishment that supports agribusiness, makes minimal reforms to controversial practices, and works within the Animal Welfare Act parameters, which is founded on the principle that animals exist for human benefit. Morris and Beatson observe that all decisions on animal welfare in New Zealand take place in two ministerially appointed bodies: the National Animal Welfare Advisory Committee and the National Animal Ethics Advisory Committee, both of which fall under the guidance of the Ministry of Agriculture. The 'centre-left'includes individuals and groups which challenge the centre-right regulatory establishment through various strategies, including public protests, educational campaigns, and rescue operations.

While the animal welfare science camp opposes animal suffering in principle, it justifies its activities through adherence to the regulatory and legal doctrine of the Animal Welfare Act, which has gained the approval of those who presumably know best the needs of animals—scientists. Thus, the New Zealand government is covered by a regulatory system designed to deflect criticism of animal suffering through science. Furthermore, science dominates the playing field through grants from the agribusiness establishment where success is measured by publications and academic chairs, "rather than the amount of suffering alleviated."

(Morris & Beatson, 2011, p. 130). The upshot of this system is what Morris and Beatson refer to as "institutionalised brutality" in all aspects of animal use, where the routine suffering of animals has now become normalised—not too far removed from Greece's sacrificial economy, above.

Mapping the end of animal suffering in tourism

The following model on the elimination of animal suffering in tourism is adapted from Lilley et al. (2014), who argue that two principal domains should be included in efforts to eliminate *severe* suffering: cultural and procedural. We add a third domain "Terminal" to emphasise the importance of this part of the model, and a new stage ("Define") between "Culture" and "Audit", to suggest that it is important to get the terminology right along scientific and ethical lines before we can eliminate suffering in animals in tourism (Fig. 1). The cultural domain includes establishing and maintaining a progressive and caring organisational culture (refer to section 4, above). Care ethics and empathy work as cornerstones for developing an ethically robust organisational



Fig. 1. A road map to end animal suffering at tourist attractions.
Source: Adapted from Lilley et al. (2014)).

culture based on intermingling self with animals used in tourism operations from the perspective of attentiveness, sensitivity, responsibility and responsiveness to the interests and needs of animals (Adams & Donovan, 2007; Held, 2004; Taylor, Hurst, Stinson, & Grimwood, 2020). Empathy, and entangled empathy, are important because they provide a framework for trying to understand these needs and interests (Aaltola, 2013) or the "experience of another's experience" (Svenaeus, 2018) in striving to be a moral organisation.

Building a culture of empathy in tourism organisations requires a coordinated effort between several stakeholders (academics, the tourism industry, public agencies, and animal welfare organisations). Lilley et al. (2014) argue that the apparatus of such a culture includes the following components (adapted for tourism purposes):

- A collective responsibility and accountability for the welfare of animals, shared by all staff, through the development of high organisational codes of ethics, standards, and policies;
- Demonstrable support at the corporate level from senior management;
- Internal organisational openness, including raising, sharing, and resolving concerns without negative repercussions for employees;
- Employees dedicated to working with animal care support organisations (e.g., Animal Care and Welfare Officers, Veterinary Surgeons);
- A robust framework for the training, assessment of competence, and continued professional development of all staff;
- Effective and well-supported reviews of scientific work through a knowledge translation process; and
- A good ethics or animal care and use committee as part of the fabric of the organisation.

The procedural domain of Fig. 1 includes five steps. The first is a call for all employees of the organisation to understand suffering from science (refer to section 2, above), ethics (section 3), and policy (section 4) perspectives (see, also, Tables 1, 2 and 3). Good definitions of suffering will provide the necessary foundation for robust policy that will lead to best practices in avoiding the pitfall of ignorance and arrogance that has been a consistent undercurrent in the poor treatment of animals in tourism. An internal animal ethics or care committee, suggested above, should provide leadership to accomplish this end.

The second step is to establish the extent of animal suffering in organisations through an internal severity audit of all animal practices with a focus on enduring (sustained suffering) and ultimate (death) costs (Fennell, 2021) that result from such use (refer to section 5). Animals held in conditions that suppress natural behaviours suffer, and the degree to which they attempt to perform natural behaviours is a measure of how vital a behaviour is to them (Dawkins, 1988). This step will include a review of the practices that lead to suffering in animals used by the organisation, and any records that have been kept or cases where external care (e.g., veterinarian) has been required to assess the health and wellbeing of animals (Lilley et al., 2014; Tables 2 and 3).

Step three takes information from the audit and establishes why suffering occurs and what current methods and tools are used to avoid it, *if any*. Less responsible operations will have in-house staff who take care of animals' health in a haphazard manner. More responsible tourism firms will regularly use veterinarians or other animal care workers that have proper animal care training and education. Lilley et al. (2014) identify several questions to consider in the evaluation process. Adapted, these include:

- Which species, and what number, suffer at the attraction? Priority should be given to those that suffer the most.
- What other types of tourist-animal interactions can be used to reduce suffering?
- Whether animal use and suffering are necessary to achieve touristic ends?
- What measures can be used to improve the welfare of animals at the attraction?

It is encouraging that some of the worst abusers of animals are in the process of changing their practices. For example, Germany's Circus Roncalli now uses 3D holographic animals to "perform" tricks formally done by real animals (Knaggs, 2019). A coalition of industry stakeholders has the mandate of working toward the end of animal cruelty in tourism (World Animal Protection, 2020).

The fourth step is a process of identifying obstacles that prevent the termination of suffering in a firm's use of animals based on internal and external factors (refer to sections 3 and 4). Internal factors, or those within the organisation, include a lack of knowledge on the part of staff (e.g., training) or lack of will from management to make change. When we underestimate the mental sophistication of animals under our care, i.e., we make epistemic empathetic mistakes (Gruen, 2015), we suppress and/or deny suffering in order to work with animals guilt-free (Moody-Adams, 1994; Wicks, 2011). However, as Rollin (2004) observed, businesses need to keep pace with moral transformations taking place within society and keep up with these changes in order to stay legitimate. Font et al. (2019) identified the failings of national and international trade associations in accounting for the welfare needs of animals used in their practices. Furthermore, organisations need to take seriously the impact of social media and review platforms in staying abreast of the public's expectations around animal cruelty and suffering.

External mechanisms include regulatory and institutional frameworks at regional and national levels where welfare policy is designed to protect the interests of industry over the interests of animals as normal behaviour (Morris & Beatson, 2011) (refer to section 4). The failure of the UNWTO to include a powerful statement on animal suffering also represents an external mechanism that could have a considerable global impact (Fennell, 2014). Such would help with what appears to be only peripheral concern with animals' interests on the part of national and regional bodies when establishing policy for protecting animals (Sheppard & Fennell, 2019).

The final step in the procedural domain involves a plan to overcome obstacles in ending animal suffering at tourism attractions. Connectivity and cooperation through stakeholder inclusiveness should be the norm, including similar attractions working

together to end animal suffering. Good use should be made of tourist reviews, as poor reviews have social costs that attractions need to avoid for success. Furthermore, current research should be consulted in the development of state-of-the-art programs. New research on animal justice, for example, indicates how ethics can mesh with practice in identifying deep justice for animals used in tourism instead of attractions that provide intermediate, shallow or no justice at all (Fennell & Sheppard, 2020). Identifying where the organisation falls within this justice framework, and the standards inherent within each level, can help achieve best practices through virtuous action and an ethic of care.

Ending suffering is the final domain in Fig. 1. Such will be an enormous task for an industry that has long depended on animal suffering for profit and pleasure. A representative example of intense suffering is the phajaan, which translates to breaking the spirit of elephants through torture and isolation, so they respond to the commands of handlers (Olivares, Kiley-Worthington, & Rendle-Worthington, 2019). Expecting this practice to stop immediately is difficult in light of significant economic, cultural, and political challenges (Morris & Beatson, 2011). The same applies to the unreasonable assumption on the part of many tourism brokers that aquaria will soon return cetaceans to the wild, people will stop racing horses, and yaks will stop transporting enormous loads.

Given these challenges and impracticalities at present, tourism operators must learn to recognise signs and symptoms that indicate significant changes in animals' health and well-being (Murnaghan, 2018b), ways to measure suffering, and remove organisational and institutional deficiencies that lead to suffering. Select examples from this paper for further consideration include the use of calculators to measure animal suffering in tourism (Tomasik, 2018), understanding acute and chronic pain (Molony & Kent, 1997), the asymmetrical nature of suffering and happiness along utilitarian lines (Shriver, 2014), learning to be responsive to animals in empathetic ways (Gruen, 2015), and recognizing that tourism is a sacrificial economy based on institutionalised brutality in its use of animals (Dolgert, 2012; Fennell, 2021; Morris & Beatson, 2011).

Conclusion

In humans, suffering is a universal indicator of reduced physiological, behavioural, and emotional welfare. A parallel argument has been made in this paper for animals, who must endure a range of practices and conditions that lead to diminished well-being. Like the factory farming and animal experimentation industries, the tourism industry continues to be led by an outdated Cartesian mindset that embraces the sanctity of pleasure and profit rendering us blind to suffering. Unlike these other industries, however, tourism does not attract a massive amount of funding for welfare research because of the importance of these industries to commerce (health and food as basics to *human* survival), and because of the optics of so much suffering in the face of social demands. We argue that similar investment should be placed into the elimination of animal suffering in tourism because of tourism's global importance as an economic engine and because of the sheer number of animals used and abused. How an industry based on human pleasure (psychological needs), compares to health and food industries (physiological needs), is a question of considerable weight.

We used knowledge from many fields to build a case to end suffering of animals used in tourism. The proposed model provides a tangible set of internal (organisational culture), operational (e.g., audits, evaluations), and external (e.g., political, economic) factors that provide the needed impetus to plan, develop, and manage animal attractions on a much higher ethical plane. Acting as such requires a comprehensive, if not complicated, turn in values at many levels of the tourism system that the proposed road map aims to address. What may catalyse this complicated turn is a shifting mindset that places tourism in the position of being a champion for positive, meaningful interactions with animals instead of one that diminishes respect and dignity. Tourists may in fact be the agents of this change as social ethics (Rollin, 2004) and values bubble to the surface, and education of tourists (and all tourism stakeholders) continues to advance. The hope is that the institutionalised brutality (Morris & Beatson, 2011) that takes place in animal use industries, such as tourism, answers to these changing values and expectations.

The theoretical contribution of this work lies in an application of care ethics and empathy, especially entangled empathy. In forging new epistemological and ontological bridges between animals and humans (Adams & Donovan, 2007), empathy allows for the “experience of another person's experience” (Svenaeus, 2018, p. 742), or rather the experience of another being's experience, as we argue here. As we stive to understand, which first requires a *willingness* to understand, as a reference point for intersubjectivity (Aaltola, 2013), we exercise our ability to be moral. The more we practice this morality, the more we are able to build close bonds with animal others (Gruen, 2015) in efforts to be truly responsible. Circling back to the quote at the outset of the paper by Vantassel (2010), we need to decide what kind of *tourism* world we want it to be. Responsibility and sustainability in the manner outlined in the UNWTO's Global Code of Ethics for Tourism misses the mark by failing to appreciate the magnitude of suffering that animals endure at the hand of profit and pleasure (Fennell, 2014). Animals matter because they exist (Bekoff, 2007) not because of their instrumental value to humans, and we do damage to ourselves as individuals and organisations when we treat them poorly (Mather, 2001).

Advances to the proposed framework may be aided through the use of existing models which provide greater theoretical depth to the link between tourism, animals and ethics. Fennell and Sheppard's (2020) work on animals, tourism and the scales of justice provides a tie between theory and practice on the use of animals in tourism. Thomsen, Thomsen, et al. (2021) theorize a posthumanist multispecies livelihoods framework to account for the rights, agency, and welfare of individual animals in wildlife ecotourism. However, a comprehensive statement on animal agency in tourism is absent in the literature, which should complement efforts to reify suffering in tourism. The tourism literature also lacks hard quantitative data that recognises the actual numbers of animals used in tourism, let alone an accurate assessment of their treatment, welfare, agency, and whether an individual is suffering. The hope is that scholars, government agencies, funding agencies, practitioners, and NGOs recognise the importance of animal suffering in tourism and make its termination a primary focus.

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Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

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