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With this issue, we are introducing a series of papers on 'Tourism and animal ethics', a somewhat obscure though significant theme. The series will include discussion on animal ethics: rights, welfare, etc. David Fennell comes up with the inaugural contribution and takes up one of the five main theories that frame the debate on animal ethics. Readers are welcome to send their opinion (1000 words) for our ***Readers' Response*** *column which is open to constructive criticism that advances knowledge on this subject. For details, contact Editor-in-Chief, Tourism Recreation Research, A-965/6 Indira Nagar, Lucknow, India. e-mail: trrworld@gmail.com*

Tourism and Animal Rights

DAVID A. FENNELL

Abstract: This paper investigates the extent to which animal rights theory has permeated the mainstream of tourism research. Examples of these uses are cited along with the context of this use. Although animal rights theory appears to be used in greater detail in tourism, especially of late, what is missing is a comprehensive overview of the theory and meaning of animal rights, and how or if it fits in tourism. The paper argues that animal rights theory is almost entirely antithetical to tourism, based on how this use fails to take into consideration the inherent value of animals that make them subjects-of-a-life or ends-in-themselves. Ecotourism is discussed as an example of a form of tourism that corresponds to animal rights in theory. Some of the challenges and contradictions of aligning ecotourism with animal rights are highlighted, with suggestions for more work in this area. .

Keywords: tourism; animal rights; animal ethics; animal welfare.

Introduction

People use animals in many different ways, and at a scale that may be classified as boundless. Humane Society International (2012) reports that more than 150 million animals are used globally as experimental subjects each year. In Canada alone, over 3.3 million animals were used for teaching, research and testing in 2010, with fish (1.4 million) used more than any other species (Canadian Council on Animal Care 2012). As sources of food, production and consumption of meat will rise from 233 million metric tons (mt) to 300 mt; milk will increase from 568 to 700 million mt; and egg production will increase by 30%, all between 2000 and 2020 (Speedy 2003). In 2009, the number of animals killed worldwide for consumption in the US amounted to 59 billion. About 40 million animals are killed for their fur each year worldwide, and US hunters kill over 200 million animals per year (About.com 2012). In Texas alone, hunting generates more than 1 billion dollars per annum (Kluger 2002).

Beyond their use in experimentation and as sources of food, animals are used for entertainment in untold numbers. Zoos and aquaria keep millions of animals, while charismatic animals like elephants and tigers are active in circuses and festivals. Snakes and bears labor as street performers in many lesser developed countries, and monkeys are often used as props at beaches and other attractions. Horses and dogs are raced, bulls are baited and fought, and fish are kept in restaurants to amuse tourists (see Animals Asia 2012). Animals also perform a wide range of duties that help facilitate the needs of tourists in remote settings (e.g., carriers), and nature-based tourists pursue a tremendous number and variety of species as hunters, anglers and viewers (Fennell forthcoming).

Whether for experimentation, food, or entertainment, what is common among these uses is that animals are treated as resources or commodities to satisfy human interest (Wearing and Jobberns 2011). But in the pursuit of profit and pleasure, the tourism industry has not stopped to ask whether this use is defensible on moral grounds. The industry can always justify using animals on the basis of profit. And we might also justify use according to principles of good animal welfare. This means that as long as an animal's well-being is taken care of and suffering is limited (i.e., proper treatment in terms of water, food, stress, pain, space, and other measures), such use is morally justifiable. What we have been less eager to do, however, is to examine this use from an animal rights perspective. Animal rights, the topic of this paper, is a position that argues for the total abolishment of animals used as instruments or commodities for human ends-a position that would seem at odds with the nature of tourism. Animal welfare advocates argue for bigger

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and better cages for animals used in tourism. Animal rights advocates argue for empty cages (Regan 1997).

Yet, even though the animal rights position appears to be at odds with the use of animals in tourism, a review of literature shows that it is not without representation. To date, however, there has not been a comprehensive exploration of the animal rights view and its deeper meaning in tourism studies. As such, this paper aims to (1) examine the extent to which animal rights is used in tourism, and in what context, from the perspective of popular media and research; (2) review, in depth, animal rights theory from the perspective of those who support it and those who do not; and (3) question whether there is a place for animal rights in tourism at all. This topic should not be taken lightly. The issue of whether or not animals possess rights is of great practical and theoretical importance in tourism. If we have direct duties to animals because they are seen to possess certain basic rights, this would significantly impact how we treat them. If, on the other hand, animals do not possess rights, the tourism industry could justify current practices on moral grounds.

Tourism and Animal Rights: A Review

Media

Recognition of the scale and diversity of ways in which animals are used in tourism has intensified recently through the media. For example, Hartman (2010) reports that tourists by the hundreds visiting Safari World just outside of Bangkok, Thailand, regularly pay to watch orang-utans box each other in a ring, with other apes dressed as round card girls for the amusement of the crowd. The attraction has been in operation for decades, despite a government ban several years ago (Hartman 2010). In Turkey, hoteliers illegally exploit chimpanzees for the purpose of entertaining tourists. The animals are dressed in human clothes, made to drink coke, and perform various acrobatic acts so that tourists can take photographs. The chimpanzees are smuggled into Turkey from Africa (Neel 2011). At the Siem Reap Crocodile Farm in Cambodia, tourists are able to purchase chickens for US$ 10 and permitted to throw these into a crocodile pit to be eaten alive. Ducks can be purchased for the same purpose for US$ 7 (Watts 2011). In Pakistan, even though bear baiting has been banned since 1980, it continues for the pleasure of locals and tourists (Drake 2011). In New York city, critics continue to work towards a ban on the use of horse carriage rides, citing abuse and suffering of the animals. Horses must endure constant noise, pollution, vehicular traffic, cold weather, and with no access to pasture. There are cases where horses have simply dropped dead due to exhaustion (Smith 2011).

In many cases, public outcry over the abuse of animals has been so strong that boycotts of the tourism industry have been organized. In Kerala, India, the inhumane killing of dogs, turtles, and rabbits has prompted the creation of a petition with the aim of appealing to all countries and citizens to stay away from Kerala (Care2 2012). Irish groups have launched a Europe-wide campaign to boycott tourism in India because of the practice of *Jallikattu*. This contact game involves hundreds of men surrounding a bull for the purpose of hitting it and wrestling the animal to the ground. The animals are made to drink alcohol and have chilli powder rubbed in their eyes to level the playing field (Suroor 2012). The group Friends of Animals called for a boycott of the Alaskan tourism industry in response to the government's practice of aerial control of the wolf population. Critics believe that the ecotourism industry would be hardest hit by the boycott (Friends of Animals 2006).

What is troubling to the aforementioned writers is that although responsible and ethical travel plays a more significant role in the tourism industry these days, the issue of animal well-being has been almost completely overlooked. The use and abuse of animals in so many different ways is said to be the cost of doing business (Clancy 2010).

Tourism Research

Representation of the animal rights view in tourism scholarship may be characterized as limited at best. While there are a number of publications that mention animal rights, many of these do so in a one-off or cursory manner. Examples of this work include moral issues tied to business (Robson and Robson 1996), and consumer protest (Hughes 1995); the impact animal rights has had on Arctic economies (Notzke 1999); wildlife tourism (Reynolds and Braithwaite 2001) and ecotourism (Novelli et al. 2006; Baker 1997 in relation to ecotourism and hunting); and also in reference to marketing food tourism (Boyne et al. 2003).

Animal rights has been the topic of discussion in reference to specific species, but also in a limited way. Whale tourism and animal rights have been examined in the context of conflicting values (Ris 1993), and also in reference to trade-offs between commercial whaling and tourism (Herrera and Hoagland 2006). Theorists have discussed ethical issues tied to elephant-back tourism in Thailand from an animal rights perspective (Duffy and More 2010; Kontogeorgopoulos 2009). Thompson et al. (2003) illustrate that on Fraser Island, Australia, the dingoes controversy has generated management proposals not only from animal rights activists but also many other stakeholders involved in tourism. Passing mention is given to animal rights in work that focuses on tourism and zoos (Beardsworth and Bryman, 2001; Holtorf

2008). Fennell (2000) has debated the legitimacy of billfishing as a form of ecotourism along animal rights lines. He contends that billfishing should not be viewed as ecotourism because this activity induces pain, stress, and even death from the pursuit and catch of the animal. What qualifies as ethical treatment of animals in the context of ecotourism cannot be measured by a healthy population metric alone because this does not respect the value of individuals within these populations.

Tourism research that offers a more comprehensive perspective on animal rights includes Hughes (2001), who provided one of the earliest forays into tourism and animal rights in his work on captive dolphins in the UK. In particular, the promotion of an animal rights standpoint through lobbying and direct communication with tourists led to a shift from viewing dolphins in captivity to viewing them in the wild. Orams (2002) built a typology of human provisioning of food to other species according a status to animals as gods, equals, and subordinates. It is the second of these, equals, which discusses the importance of recognizing rights and needs of animals, and that this recognition should be built into our decision-making. Lovelock's (2008) work on consumptive wildlife tourism underscores the division between hunting and fishing with respect to animal rights activists, with the former garnering much more attention than the latter. Shani and Pizam (2008) contrasted environmental ethics, welfare, and animal ethics in the assessment of various types of tourism. Those who subscribe to the animal rights view outrightly reject tourism activities that induce pain and suffering in animals, as well as the removal of animals from their natural habitats (see also Shani and Pizam 2010). Wearing et al. (2011) discuss issues tied to the use of animals in whale-watching and film. In particular, the wellbeing of animals is a concern not for the sake of animals themselves (see Molloy 2011 for a discussion on how television programmes inspire travel to see exotic animals and other attractions), but rather so that they are fit for continued commercial exploitation. Wearing and his colleagues (2011) argue that unless ecotourism is able to recognize the rights of animals, this form of tourism losses its power to make claims of moral superiority over other forms of tourism (see also Wheeller 1994; Butcher 2002). While there is no magic bullet for ensuring a de-commodified ecotourism, the authors argue that re-education of ecotourists is important, as well as placing the needs of animals over the needs of tourists and practitioners, in a climate of respect. This rationale, i.e., that rights are important in tourism (as part of a constellation of ethical approaches tied to the use of animals), has been discussed at length by Fennell (2012).

While research is slowly evolving in reference to animal rights and tourism, not one of the aforementioned articles (Fennell's 2012 book aside) deals exclusively with animal rights. Theorists may discuss animal rights as perhaps something different than animal welfare (in some cases there is no differentiation between animal rights and animal welfare), but do so in the absence of a theoretical foundation that would allow researchers to use this approach in a more informed, versatile manner.

The Rights View: What Is It?

Concern for animal rights and welfare is a topic that has a rich history. While it is not the purpose to examine this history here, readers should source Preece (2002, 2005) for a comprehensive overview of this past. Henry Salt in the late nineteenth century is an example of one of the early texts with a specific emphasis on the moral rights of animals (Palmer, 2010), and Francis Hutcheson had an early influence during the eighteenth century (Garrett 2007).

The most articulate argument in support of the animal rights view in contemporary times-said to be 'brilliant' (Ost 1986)-is Regan's (2004), The Case for Animal Rights. Regan's theory is based on inherent value, which means that individuals exist as ends-in-themselves, i.e., they have value in their own right. Regan argues that inherent value is categorical in the sense that individuals either have it or they do not. This is not a type of value that is a matter of degree, such that some have more inherent value than others, but rather a value that all who are subjects-of-a-life have equally.

Regan argues that those animals that have inherent value, who qualify as subjects-of-a-life, include normal mammals of one year or more in age. In other work, Regan (2003) has argued that birds and even fish are deserving of rights (see also Cavalieri 2001, who contends that rights should be extended not only to mammals, but also all vertebrates in general). The criteria used by Regan to ascribe rights includes consciousness, intentionality, and sentience. For those in the possession of these characteristics or capacities, Regan argues that all are subjects-of-a-life:

> *If they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interest. Those who satisfy the subject-of-a-life criterion themselves have a distinctive kind of value – inherent value – and are not to be viewed or treated as mere receptacles (p. 243).*

Respect is a cornerstone of Regan's theory, which is derived from formal justice in a way that is deemed to be egalitarian (i.e., we deserve the same respect equally) and non-perfectionist (i.e., one individual is no better and therefore more deserving of a higher level of moral regard than anyone else). We should never use others as resources or as means to an end. Beyond this, the justice principle demands that we not only treat individuals with respect in the manner described above, but we also have a *prima facie* duty to help those who are victims of injustice from the deeds of others, and to never harm individuals (Regan's harm principle, which derives from the more general respect principle).

This suggests that there are strict limits on how we should treat others. Regan argues that this perspective is Kantian (deontological) and not teleological (e.g., utilitarian), but there is an important departure away from how Kant developed his position. Kant felt that only those in the possession of the characteristics that defined moral agency (an autonomous agent with the ability to control decisions through free will) should not be treated as a means to an end. Animals were not in the possession of these characteristics, which meant that, in Kant's world, they could be used as instruments and resources to satisfy human ends. Based on his subject-of-a-life criterion, Regan extends the boundaries of this view to afford value and respect not just to people as moral agents but also to animals as moral patients. This important aspect demands further consideration.

Moral agents are those individuals who have crossed an evolutionary threshold with regard to the weighing of options in terms of what is morally right and wrong. This comes packaged with the ability to act according to the disposition of the agent-there is free will that comes to bear on the situation at hand. However, because of this moral aptitude the agent must be accountable for his or her actions. By contrast, moral patients are those beings who lack the capacity to use moral principles in deciding how to act under a given situation. Important in this distinction is that because of this inability to weigh what is right and wrong, the moral patient is excused of any responsibility over acts that would be viewed as morally wrong. These individuals, which would include infants and the mentally disabled (this is the Argument from Marginal Cases, which asserts that whatever rights marginal humans are extended as human moral patients should be also extended to comparable-minded animals, according to Graham and Nobis 2007) along with animals, can do no right nor can they do any wrong. They are, in essence, innocent. However, although moral patients are never right or wrong in a moral sense, they can be on the receiving end of right or wrong acts from moral agents. We cannot justify the beating of a human infant nor can we justify the abuse of a cognitively disabled human by moral agents. It is just as wrong for a moral agent to beat or abuse an animal that conforms to the subject-of-a-life criterion described above: 'Morality will not tolerate the use of double standards when cases are relevantly similar' (Regan 2004: 240). As such, the boundary of the moral community has traditionally been defined according to those we owe direct duties to, i.e., those assigned moral agency. Through Regan's rights view, we should have direct duties to animals not unlike the direct duties we have toward each other.

Regan (2004)takes great care in differentiating legal rights from moral rights. Legal rights are said to be troubling because they change according to the society in which one lives. By contrast, moral rights are universal. If one is extended a moral right, then someone else of the same species ought to be extended the same right according to egalitarian and nonperfectionist arguments, above.

Regan (2004) continues by illustrating that if we have a moral right we are in a position to claim something that is owed to us-we are entitled to treatment of a certain kind (McCloskey 1965). But we must understand that to make a claim involves claims-against individual(s) to do what is claimed to do, as well as claims-to in reference to what is owed. Correspondingly, Regan writes that one 'cannot have a valid claim (i.e., a right) if I do not have a valid claim-against someone, and I cannot have a valid claim-against someone if that individual does not have a duty to me to do or forbear doing the act I claim is owed me' (p. 272). This means that if I have a moral right, say, the right not to be physically harassed, then others have a direct duty to me in reference to this right. Regan takes this position further in arguing that we have a duty of justice as a basic right, and further that this basic right applies to all who have inherent value. That is, if I have a moral right to just treatment, then others have a direct duty to me in reference to upholding this right. Regan argues that it is not simply humans who are deserving of this right, but all beings categorised as having inherent value, as above.

In his earlier work, Regan (1997) enlists Ronald Dworkins' (1977) claim that in democratic societies individual rights 'trump' collective interests. There are actions that, morally speaking, cannot be done to individuals if the collective stands to gain from these actions. By parallel, Regan suggests that if animals have rights, these rights override the benefits that would be derived by the collective (humans) for gain. This means that the use of animals for experimentation (Regan's example), or for entertainment in zoos and circuses, is morally unjustifiable. As such, if the rights of the individual trump all else, and if animals have

rights, then all uses of animals that infringe upon their basic rights for human gain must be abolished. The legal scholar Steven Wise (2001) has taken this argument one step further in arguing that normal adult chimpanzees should be entitled to basic legal rights because on their advanced mental capabilities. In a subsequent publication, he examines why seven other species should be afforded basic legal rights (Wise 2003).

Although scientists, in particular ethologists, have made significant strides into the cognitive and affective complexity of animal minds (see Fennell 2012), it still remains difficult to understand how other species think. Regardless, Regan (2004) argues that there is a burden of proof argument that follows that 'unless or until we are shown that there are better reasons for denying that these animals have beliefs and desires, we are rationally entitled to believe that they do' (p. 78).

Advocates and Adaptations

Several philosophers have extended or adapted Regan's theory. Gary Francione (1996), for example, adopts an animal rights position based on abolitionism. He argues that people should never use animals for any purpose, whether for food, clothing, or other products. Francione supports the belief that veganism should act as the baseline for any theory on animal rights. He also rejects approaches that focus on cognitive capacity in animals as the sole criterion for assessment of moral value. Apes, for example, should not be extended greater moral value over lesser beings because of their higher intelligence. Instead, moral consideration should be based on sentiency-subjective awareness. He feels that such an approach, and animal rights movement in general, is simply the evolution of peace and non-violence. Sentient beings, he argues, should have at least one right, which is the right not to be treated as someone else's property-not to be treated as an economic commodity. Bortolotti (2006) builds on the use of sentience as a key criterion for animal rights in suggesting that while people have the capacity to exercise reason and autonomy to their full extent, we should recognize that these capacities come in degrees. Other species may be minimally autonomous in virtue of the fact that they have preferences, such as the preference to avoid pain, which they work to satisfy (see also Beauchamp 1997).

Other advocates such as Bernard Rollin (1981) argue that animals, not unlike humans, have a telos-a nature or essence that is intrinsic to them. We breach our obligations to these other beings when we act in ways that violate this essence. This means that animals should have a right to live the kind of life that is in harmony with this essence. The view that animals must exist outside of our moral community on the basis of being irrational is wrong according to Rollin because rationality (see Francione 1996) is not a morally relevant characteristic. (See also Haworth 1978, who has argued that non-human animals have at least one right, which is the right not to be cruelly treated.)

Philosophers have also weighed in on the topic of aiding animals subject to predation. Just as we have a duty not to kill other humans, we also have a duty to assist humans in preserving their lives. The argument follows that if animals have a right to life, humans ought to have a duty to assist animals in preserving their lives. Simmons (2009) argues that the killing of animals in the wild by predators and the right not to be killed are two different questions. Humans should not interfere in the predator-prey dynamic because doing so would have massive ecological consequences. Predators would starve, which in turn would have consequences for predator populations, followed by over-population of prey species in ecosystems, with ripple effects throughout the food chain. We may have duties to aid or save domesticated species like pets and farm animals from being killed by wild animals because these animals live outside the realm of the wild with little possibility of ecological disaster.

In related work, Doğan (2011) argues for the defence of wild animal rights because these animals don't naturally belong to us. Since wild animals exist independent of our ownership they can make a claim against humans because their bodies and their own well-being belong to them. They have a natural right to their bodies and to their well-being and, as such, this imposes on us a duty of non-interference.

Finally, Frank (2002) argues that Regan's rights view should take into consideration environmental uncertainty. He argues for an approach based on unequal weighting of different species according to various rights and obligations (see also Moore 2002, who argues for unequal rights for moral agents and moral patients). Taylor (1996) suggests that we ought to embrace a vital-needs rights view. In this view, humans would be able to use or interfere in the lives of animals for the purpose of satisfying vital needs, e.g., it would be morally permissible to kill animals in doing what is required for our survival.

Critics

Much of the criticism waged against the animal rights view stems from ideas presented by McCloskey (1965), who argues that there are two conditions that must be in place for the granting of rights. The first is that only a being that can possess things can possess rights. Second, only a being that can possess interests can possess rights. In reference to the

animal rights debate, McCloskey (1979) contends that rights assume equality, reciprocity and responsibility. If animals cannot assume these capacities, they are not deserving of rights.

Perhaps the most outspoken critic of the animal rights perspective is Carl Cohen, who argues that the granting of rights should be done on a species-specific basis, not on the basis of individuals. Humans are granted rights because they are capable of distinguishing between their own interests on the basis of some external notion of right or wrong. That is, humans have the ability to comprehend rules of society as different, perhaps, from what is in their best interests. Animals can't do this. As such, Cohen feels that animals are completely amoral-they simply have nothing close to any concept of morality. In this vein, Cohen (1997) writes that

> *But a rat can no more be said to have rights than a table can be said to have ambition. To say of a rat that it has rights is to confuse categories, to apply to its world a moral category that has content only in the human moral world (p. 60).*

The species argument fails according to Hadley (2006) in reference to duties owed to those in dire need, i.e., we should only aid those including the cognitively impaired because they are members of our own species. For Hadley there is no good reason to exclude non-human animals in reference to our aid because human and non-human have comparable interests in the avoidance of suffering and in prolonging their lives. Despite being non-human, animals are in many respects equal to humans as regards their needs (see Nobis 2004 as one of many examples of why Cohen's arguments against animals having rights are felt to be unsound).

Olen and Barry (1989) are opposed to the animal rights view under the belief that we are not being discriminatory against animals because animals do not share the same capacity for morality, 'morality is our own-humankind's-institution, developed and maintained and improved for our own purposes, for our own individual and social good' (p. 382). They argue that if there were other species that had this moral capacity, for example people from Mars or the apes in Planet of the Apes, we would gladly invite them into the moral community of equals. That is, we should not discriminate on the basis of species, but rather on the fact that these other groups do not have the same moral and intellectual capacity. This is not being speciesist, because the term implies otherwise according to their rationale (see also Ost (1986), who argues that animals are incapable of bearing rights and obligations, so should remain outside the moral community).

Machan (2002, 2007) uses the Great Chain of Being or scale of nature argument to suggest that humans are *prima facie* more important than all other species by virtue of what we have and can do over these others. Because we are more important and valuable, we can use animals as instruments for our own ends. It is perfectly acceptable to use animals in medical testing if this would lead to greater 'success in living our lives' (p. 44). Like many of the other critics above, Machan's argument falls squarely on the premise that rights are based on moral agency, which entails being able to choose between what is right or wrong. Because animals lack what Machan calls 'volitional consciousness', or the capacity to make reflective choices, they do not have moral rights (Machan 2004; see also Willard 1982). This perspective has been subject to great debate between philosophers. For example, Oderberg (200) asserts that consciousness in the form of sentience and perception are not sufficient conditions to bestow rights to animals. In response, Burgess-Jackson (2008) argues that since animals do have at least one interest-the interest in not suffering-they can and do have rights.

Oliver (2008) contends that the animal rights position can be criticized because it draws analogies between animals and humans of so-called inferior status like people of colour and women. Slaves were treated like animals when they were bought and sold and made to work on plantations. Women were treated like animals because they are said to be closer to nature in their reproductive and child-rearing functions. These analogies are difficult because of the way animal ethics, including animal rights, views these marginal groups as animals and like animals. Oliver argues that Regan's theory can be criticised because he does not discuss norms of personhood, which has been a convenient way by which to justify the poor treatment of women and people of colour. If we cannot draw a line between what can be classified as normal human and abnormal human, because of blurs created by norms of personhood, how is it that we can distinguish proper rights between humans and animals. It is not so easy to make a distinction between the haves and have-nots when it comes to inherent value, which has plagued the human rights discourse (see Saloña Bordas 2004). There is also a robust ecofeminist critique of the rights view that suggests rights and justice as normative approaches are more heavily weighted to a male dominated view of the world, whereas women have more of an ethic of care, which is not represented necessarily in the debate on animal interests (Slicer 1995).

Is There a Place for Animal Rights in Tourism?

For critics of the animal rights view, the use of animals in tourism should continue because, in general, there is nothing close to equality, reciprocity, and responsibility in

animals. People posses these competencies; animals do not. There is no discrimination against animals, therefore, because humans are simply more important (Machan 2007). Animals have nothing close to our ability to moralize so we should not treat them as equals (Olen and Barry 1989).

By contrast, advocates of the rights position would take a dim view of activities like fishing, hunting, zoos and other captive environments, animals as workers, contestants, or any other enterprise where commercial exploitation places the interests of humans over the interests of animals. This is because there is little discussion in tourism research, and even less in practice, on the direct duties that we have towards animals in the possession of inherent value as a matter of justice and respect (Regan 2004). Others, including Francione (1996), contend that it is wrong to use animals because moral consideration should be based not on intelligence, but rather sentiency-those in the possession of subjective awareness, including the ability to experience pain and pleasure. All sentient beings should not be treated as someone else's property. Other advocates contend that all animals should have at least one right, which is the right not to be treated cruelly.

When tourists pay to feed live chickens to crocodiles there is no sense of awareness of the inherent value of those sacrificed, or of their ability to sense and feel pain. Human value is placed over crocodile value (animals kept in enclosures on display), which is in turn placed over the value of chickens and ducks. And even amongst chickens and ducks there are differing values. Commodification is represented in the fact that chickens, perhaps due to supply and demand or simply because they are more highly valued using some other metric, are worth more than ducks. But can we say that the life of one chicken is worth more than the life of a duck? They have different economic value in this tourism practice, but their inherent value ought to be the same. The same applies to orang-utans made to fight one another and chimpanzees made to dress-up and entertain, animals kept in zoos and other captive environments, or fishing and hunting. When we treat animals as property, resources or commodities, we strip them of their value as individuals. And this concept of individual is so important to the animal rights camp. Regan (2004), through, Dworkin (1977), argues that individual rights trump collective interests, suggesting that there are actions that, morally speaking, cannot be done to individuals (animals) if the collective (the tourism industry) stands to gain from these actions.

In discussing the implications of the rights view, Regan(2004) focuses on hunting, especially commercial hunting, where animals are treated as a renewable resource-here for us-to satisfy 'human recreational, gustatory, aesthetic, social, and other interests' (p. 356). In addressing our failure to treat hunted animals with due respect according to principles of justice, Regan contends that:

> *It is, in short, human wrongs that need managing, not the "crop" of animals. Put affirmatively, the goal of wildlife management should be to defend wild animals in the possession of their rights, providing them with the opportunity to live their own life, by their own lights, as best as they can, spared that human predation that goes by the name of "sport." We owe this to wild animals, not out of kindness, not because we are against cruelty, but out of respect for their rights...wildlife managers should be principally concerned with letting animals be...allowing these "other nations" to carve out their destiny (p. 357).*

If all of the aforementioned uses of animals-hunting, fishing, captive sites, and so on-do not correspond to the rights view, the question remains if there is a form of tourism that does? Regan (2004) writes that the pleasures that hunters gain in the hunting experience such as exercise, the communion with nature, being with like-minded friends, and the skill needed to pursue animals, may be achieved in other activities like wildlife photography or hiking, which do not compromise animals' rights. Here Regan opens the door for the possibility of drawing a connection between the rights view and at least one form of tourism: ecotourism. It may well be the case that ecotourism exists as one of the only forms of tourism that uses animals where a rights view may be actuated both in theory and practice. Saloña Bordas (2004) walks this line, although not explicitly, in arguing that ecotourism would be morally acceptable if communities have control and benefits from the practice, and if animals are not disturbed. Speaking from an animal rights vantage point, Acampora (2005) makes it more explicit when he argues that, 'whatever else one may say about such ecotourism, one of its cardinal virtues is that it allows the animals to engage in, or break off, any encounter with human visitors' (p. 83). As such, hunting or fishing (see the billfishing argument, before) should not be categorized as ecotourism because animals cannot simply disengage the interaction. Humans actively pursue these animals for a purpose that is heavily oriented towards sport, adventure or consumptiveness, with little if any consideration of inherent value, sentience, respect or justice, which are cornerstones of the rights view. The placing of animal interests over human interest in the context of ecotourism ought to be built from a first principle (Fennell forthcoming)that could provide more clarity around what is and what is not ecotourism in the protection of animal interests, as follows:

> *Reject as ecotourism all practices that are based on or support animal capture and confinement, or other forms of animal use that cause suffering, for human pleasure and entertainment.*

Embrace as ecotourism interactions that place the interests of animals over the interests of human agents. This would include encounters with free-living animals that would have the liberty to engage or terminate interactions independent of human influence.

In combining this principle with animal rights and ecotourism, there are unresolved issues that demand further insight. First, there is the recognition that ecotourism is an industry-and here I mean the experience of viewing animals as a central part of this commercial enterprise. There is a firmly entrenched realism in ecotourism that animals are merely products or commodities to be used for human ends (Dowling 2008). Eco-companies significantly interfere in the life of wild animals in order to expose them to ecotourists. Too much development and too many ecotourists have led to too many unacceptable changes to habitat and animal behaviour.

However, Regan (2004) stresses in his Epilogue that the rights view need not be anti-business. On this account, and in sight of the need to conduct business for commercial gain, if ecotourism can manage to engage animals in a way that positions the interests of animals above the interests of the ecotourism industry, ecotourism will have gone some distance towards acknowledging the inherent value of animals as ends-in-themselves. Our individual and collective self-interests would take a backseat to the duties we have in protecting the rights of other beings. If ecotourism cannot accomplish this, there are questions as to whether it should maintain its claim of moral superiority over other forms of tourism less animal sensitive. (Wearing et al. 2011).

Second, if we are to reject practices that are based on animal suffering and use for pleasure based on the rights view, this calls into question the thorny issue of the food that ecotourists consume as part of the experience. If ecotourism is to be a morally defensible form of tourism according to rights theory, there are unresolved issues pertaining to the consumption of animals for pleasure, including the consumption of animals we would otherwise seek to view (ostrich, crocodile, and so on). In places like North America, eating animals is not necessary but it is done on a large scale even though there are many other food options available. However, these other food sources may not be so readily available in other contexts. The deprivation of protein in these situations has more serious implications for those deprived. Culture and necessity would therefore weigh heavily into the provision of food for both locals and ecotourists, which correspond to subsistence and vital-needs arguments made earlier (see Taylor 1996).

Based on the foregoing, there is an opportunity for the construction of an animal rights-ecotourism-food typology not unlike other typologies that have been created for ecotourism in the past. Ziffer (1989) and Acott et al. (1998) have developed these according to ecotourists and ecotourism. Wight (1997) has created a typology of ecotourism accommodation according to hard/soft dimensions (see also Fennell and Nowaczek (2010) who discuss fishing according to degrees of moral acceptability). Ecotourism, animal rights, and food consumption might be organized according to various adaptations of the rights theory discussed earlier. Ecotourism's most morally acceptable form might be termed vegan ecotourism, followed by vegetarian ecotourism, eating domesticated meat (although this is contentious because of how these animals are mass produced), and finally eating bush meat. There is scope for further investigation of if or how these different forms manifest both in theory and practice in ecotourism.

In the end, these adaptations will need to be reconciled according to a theory that, by many accounts, is said to be absolute in its defence of animal interests. Animals should be allowed to live their lives 'by their own lights' as argued by Regan (2004). From this perspective, animal rights advocates would argue that ecotourism (or any other form of tourism that wishes to adopt the rights view) should have no claim or connection to the rights province if it fails to prioritize the interests of animals over commerce and pleasure.

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